Background. Pharmaceutical compounding, the manipulation of ingredients to create a customized medication, is a widespread practice. In January 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was notified of 4 cases of Pseudomonas fluorescens bacteremia that were traced to contaminated heparinized saline intravenous flush syringes prepared as a compounded medical product.
system and appears to have become more common in the community setting since the 1980s [2] . Since 2002, multiple outbreaks of infections caused by contamination of sterile products prepared by compounding pharmacies have been reported [3] [4] [5] . Although the majority of outbreaks have involved limited numbers of patients, fatalities have occurred [4] .
On 26 January 2005, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) was notified of 4 cases of Pseudomonas fluorescens bacteremia among outpatients at an oncology clinic. All 4 patients had been exposed to heparinized saline intravenous flush syringes, which were subsequently determined by the hospital microbiology laboratory to be contaminated with P. fluorescens. The syringes had been prepared by a compounding pharmacy and a manufacturing company (Company A), both in Texas. This article summarizes the findings of our investigation of what, to our knowledge, is the largest outbreak reported to date as a result of contamination of a compounded sterile product.
PATIENTS AND METHODS
Case definition. A case was defined as an episode involving a symptomatic patient (with at least 1 of the following symptoms: chills, fever, nausea, and vomiting) who had received care at a clinic where heparinized saline flush syringes prepared by Company A were in use and had P. fluorescens, P. fluorescensPseudomonas putida group, or Pseudomonas species recovered from blood, catheter, or catheter wound sites during Case finding. Requests for reports of cases of P. fluorescens were posted on infectious diseases and public health electronic communications networks. Health care organizations that had purchased syringes were contacted and asked to search their records for reports of P. fluorescens-positive cultures.
Epidemiological investigation. We collected data on demographic characteristics, medical diagnoses, type of indwelling catheter, symptoms, microbiology results, and outcomes, including hospitalization, antibiotic therapy, catheter removal, and patient recovery. We also reviewed production of the heparinized saline syringes with employees of Company A.
Microbiology. Cultures of blood samples and of sections of explanted catheters were performed at clinical microbiology laboratories. Samples of unopened, heparinized saline syringes were grouped by lot, and cultures were performed at clinical and public health laboratories. Available P. fluorescens isolates were sent to the CDC for confirmatory identification and molecular typing.
Biofilm detection and quantification. Catheters removed from patients with delayed-onset infections in Michigan and South Dakota were sent to the CDC for detection of P. fluorescens biofilms. The biofilm detection and quantification method was modified from that of Donlan et al. [6] . The suspension containing the recovered biofilm cells was serially diluted (1:10) and spread-plated on Trypticase soy agar II (Becton Dickinson) with 5% sheep blood and MacConkey II agar (Becton Dickinson Diagnostic Systems). The agar plates were incubated for 48 h at 30ЊC, and the colonies were counted. Representative colonies were subcultured and identified using an automated identification system (Vitek II; bioMérieux) and gelatinase production.
Scanning electron microscopy. A set of catheter sections was processed for examination by scanning electron microscopy [6] . The procedure was modified by dehydrating the fixed samples 3 times in 100% ethanol for 10 min each at room temperature and immersing in hexamethyldisilazane (Polysciences) overnight at room temperature. Catheter sections were examined with a Philips XL30 environmental scanning electron microscope (FEI).
PFGE. Syringe and clinical isolates were compared by PFGE after SpeI digestion of chromosomal DNA [7] . PFGE was performed using a CHEF Mapper (Bio-Rad). Running parameters were as follows: 200 V (6 V/cm); temperature, 14ЊC; initial switch time, 10 s; final switch time, 30 s; and run time, 22 h. The percentage similarity of isolates was identified on a dendrogram derived from the unweighted-pair group method by using arithmetic means and on the basis of Dice coefficients, with use of BioNumerics software (Applied Maths). Band position tolerance and optimization were set at 1.25% and 0.5%, respectively. Isolates with similarity coefficients у80% were considered to be genetically related.
Statistical analysis. For comparing proportions, we performed a 2-tailed Fisher's exact test to calculate P values, using OpenEpi, version 2 (Open Source Epidemiologic Statistics for e Certain patients had already been hospitalized for an unrelated medical condition at the time that the diagnosis of P. fluorescens infection was made. f Certain patients were treated with intravenous antibiotics, some were treated with oral antibiotics, and some were treated with both intravenous and oral antibiotics.
Public Health). For those comparisons involving cell counts of 0, an adjustment of 0.1 was made, and the calculated P values were determined to be the same. We performed the 2-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test to compare group medians, using SAS, version 9.1 (SAS Institute). P values !.05 were considered to be statistically significant.
RESULTS
Descriptive epidemiology: all cases. During December 2004-March 2006, a total of 80 cases of P. fluorescens were identified among symptomatic patients from 6 states (figure 1). At least 52 (65%) of 80 patients experienced fever after central catheter flushing. Among 29 patients for whom more-extensive chart reviews were performed, 28 (97%) experienced chills within 8 h after central catheter flushing, and at least 6 of these patients experienced symptoms within 2 h after catheter flushing. Fortyseven cases (59%) had early onset, and 33 (41%) were delayed, occurring at least 2 months after syringe recall. 42 (53%) had organisms recovered from cultures of blood samples taken from indwelling central venous catheters, whereas 20 patients (25%) had organisms recovered from peripherally obtained (i.e., percutaneous) blood specimens (table 1) . Sixteen (20%) of 79 patients were in the hospital for unrelated medical conditions when P. fluorescens infection was diagnosed. Thirty-two (51%) of the remaining 63 patients were admitted to a hospital for treatment, and 31 patients (49%) were treated as outpatients. At least 2 patients required treatment in the intensive care unit. Of the patients for whom information was reported, 64 (93%) of 69 received treatment with oral or intravenous antibiotics, and 63 (88%) of 72 had their long-term catheters removed. No deaths were reported for any of these patients as a result of P. fluorescens infection.
Descriptive epidemiology: early versus delayed cases. For 28 (85%) of the 33 patients with delayed-onset cases, the date of most recent possible exposure to the contaminated heparinized syringes could be determined and occurred 84-421 days before P. fluorescens was identified [8] . Demographic and clinical features of patients with early-and delayed-onset cases are compared in table 2. A higher percentage of patients in the delayed-onset group than in the early-onset group had received a diagnosis of cancer (97% vs. 68%;
) and P p .002 had venous ports (100% vs. 50%;
). All delayed-onset P ! .001 cases involved outpatients at the time infection occurred, compared with 65% of early-onset cases ( ). A smaller per-P ! .001 centage of patients with delayed-onset cases than with earlyonset cases were hospitalized to treat infections (9% vs. 97%;
), but a higher percentage had their catheters removed P ! .001 (100% vs. 77%;
). P p .005 Microbiology. Heparinized saline syringes from 7 (78%) of 9 available lots (a total of 110 pooled syringes) grew P. fluorescens, ranging in quantity from 4 CFU/mL to CFU/ 5 7 ϫ 10 mL. Seventy-four (92%) of the 80 patients had an isolate that was confirmed to be P. fluorescens. Six isolates (8%) were iden- tified as P. fluorescens-P. putida group or Pseudomonas species by clinical laboratories and were discarded before they could be further characterized.
Biofilm detection and quantification. Nine catheters were examined, and all contained detectable levels of attached P. fluorescens cells, with a recovery range of 10 3 -10 6 CFU/cm 2 of catheter section. Examination by scanning electron microscopy confirmed the presence in all 9 catheters of a biofilm containing organisms morphologically consistent with P. fluorescens (figure 2) .
PFGE results. Isolates of P. fluorescens from 51 patients in 5 states were available for molecular typing. This included 29 (62%) of 47 early-onset cases and 22 (67%) of 33 delayedonset cases. PFGE demonstrated that 50 (98%) of the 51 clinical isolates were genetically related (у80% similarity), both to each other and to those isolates obtained from samples of unopened syringes (figure 3). One (2%) of 51 clinical isolates, associated with an early-onset case, was unrelated.
Trace-back investigation (production of heparinized saline flush syringes). Production of the syringes was a collaborative effort between a compounding pharmacy and the manufacturing firm, Company A. Company A purchased heparin powder and delivered it to the compounding pharmacy, where a concentrated heparin-in-saline solution was prepared. The concentrated solution was returned to Company A, where aliquots were placed into bags of sterile saline, to produce the desired end concentration. Automated equipment was used to pump the heparinized saline solution into sterile syringes; an employee then removed the syringes and affixed a cap. The filled syringes were labeled and packaged. All steps before labeling were conducted in a clean room. No finished-product testing, including concentration or sterility testing, was performed. Discussions with the owner of Company A indicated that the syringes were prepared as a compounded medical product; however, the syringes were not prepared in response to a prescription from a licensed medical practitioner. Company A also had not obtained the required premarket notification approval (510(k) approval) from the Food and Drug Administration before selling the syringes.
DISCUSSION

P. fluorescens is an infrequent cause of human infection. During 2000-2004, only 35 cases of P. fluorescens bloodstream infection
were reported to the National Nosocomial Infections Surveillance System, a voluntary reporting system of ∼300 hospitals across the United States. Although considered to be of low virulence, P. fluorescens has been reported to cause blood transfusion-associated septicemia (at times, fatal) [9, 10] , and catheter-related bacteremia among patients with cancer [11] .
We traced a nationwide outbreak of 80 cases of P. fluorescens infection to intrinsically contaminated, heparinized saline flush syringes that had been prepared as a compounded medical product. To our knowledge, this is the largest outbreak associated with a compounded pharmaceutical product in the United States. All affected patients had received care in settings in which the syringes had been purchased from Company A. P. fluorescens was isolated from multiple lots of unopened syringes, and molecular typing demonstrated that isolates obtained from patients and from syringes were genetically related.
Compounded products are estimated to comprise 1% of all prescriptions filled in the United States each year and accounted for ∼30 million prescriptions in 2003 [12] . Regulations describe pharmaceutical compounding as the combining, mixing, or altering of ingredients to "create reasonable quantities of human drugs upon receipt of a valid prescription for an individually identified patient from a licensed practitioner" [1] . However, this outbreak was associated with syringes that had been mass-produced without specific prescriptions, which is a practice consistent with pharmaceutical manufacturing and not with compounding. Regulators at the Food and Drug Administration have reported concern that the practice of performing manufacturing under the guise of compounding is a growing problem, because firms try to capitalize on the regulatory exemptions afforded to compounded products (e.g., lack of enforcement of sterility testing) to produce less expensive products [1] . Indeed, discussions with staff at certain health care facilities during this investigation indicated that the syringes in question had been chosen because they were less expensive than products from other manufacturers. Contaminated products prepared by compounding pharmacies have now been linked to multiple outbreaks [3] [4] [5] , and in at least 1 other instance, the products had been prepared in a manner more consistent with manufacturing than with compounding [4] .
This investigation was also the first to demonstrate substantially delayed infection after exposure to a contaminated intravenous solution. Cases with P. fluorescens isolates that were genetically related to isolates recovered from the heparinized saline syringes were detected as many as 421 days after a patient's last possible exposure. On-site inspection in 2 states that reported delayed-onset infections revealed that all contaminated product had been removed from use at the time of product recall, eliminating the possibility that patients might have had inadvertent and ongoing exposure to contaminated syringes. There are several potential explanations for delayed-onset cases. All delayed-onset cases involved patients with venous ports, compared with 50% of early-onset cases (
). Stan-P ! .001 dard clinic protocol was to perform maintenance port flushing after each port access and every 1-2 months for ports no longer in use because of completed chemotherapy. Detailed chart reviews revealed that some patients returned to the clinic for maintenance flushes at much longer time intervals than recommended, resulting in a delay in onset and in diagnosis of flush-associated bacteremia. Also, discussion with nurses at several of the oncology clinics revealed that certain patients who received chemotherapy initially attributed bacteremia symptoms to adverse effects of medication. Consequently, they delayed reporting their symptoms, leading to a delayed diagnosis. Another important factor was that all of the delayed cases involved outpatients at the time of diagnosis of P. fluorescens infection, compared with 65% of patients with early-onset cases (
). The patients with delayed-onset cases usually had P ! .001 left the clinic by the time of symptom onset; therefore, they were less likely to report symptoms or have blood obtained for culture while they were bacteremic. By contrast, hospital inpatients would have been more likely to have fever documented and to report symptoms immediately, permitting blood samples to be obtained while they were still bacteremic and leading to earlier diagnosis.
The delay between the most recent exposure to contaminated flush and the onset of bacteremia after use of uncontaminated flush is potentially explained by various mechanisms. Venous ports have been reported to develop fibrin and drug deposits in the reservoir below the septum, which may become infected [13] . Also, previous studies have demonstrated that nearly all indwelling vascular catheters eventually develop a biofilm [14] , an assemblage of surface-associated microbial cells embedded in a matrix of extracellular polymers produced by the microorganisms [15, 16] . Although P. fluorescens might not have entered patient bloodstreams in sufficient quantities to cause symptoms on initial exposure to the contaminated flush, organisms could have colonized port-reservoir debris or catheter biofilms and propagated subsequently. Symptomatic bacteremia then occurred via shedding of actively growing cells or shearing of cells from colonized reservoir debris or catheter biofilms during flushing.
In addition to underscoring critical concerns about pharmaceutical compounding, our investigation also highlights the public health importance of notifying all patients exposed to contaminated intravenous products, because patients remain at risk for infection as long as catheters remain in place.
Our investigation was subject to limitations. We were unable to determine the source of the P. fluorescens contamination of the syringes; no microbiological samples of raw materials or of the manufacturing environment were obtained. The finding that all cases occurred in facilities that used Company A syringes, despite the fact that the raw materials were distributed nationally, makes the likelihood of intrinsic contamination of 1 of these raw materials unlikely. Likewise, the fact that no clusters of cases of P. fluorescens bacteremia at facilities that did not receive the product were reported after national notification of this investigation also makes contamination of a widely used raw material less likely. Therefore, contamination during production appears to be the best explanation, although this theory cannot be proven. Also, our case count might be an underestimate, because facilities performed case finding through review of microbiology records; therefore, information regarding patients who presented to other health care settings might not have been captured. In addition, we were unable to calculate an attack rate, because specific information regarding the types of flushes used is not documented in clinical or pharmacy records. Furthermore, P. fluorescens isolates were not available from all patients for molecular typing by PFGE, although all cases were epidemiologically linked through receipt of care at a facility using Company A syringes. One of 51 isolates was not related to the outbreak strain. Finally, whether these 80 cases represent bloodstream infection, as opposed to catheter colonization, is unclear. Sixty-six (83%) of 80 patients had blood cultures that were positive for P. fluorescens and, therefore, met the National Healthcare Safety Network surveillance definition [17] for a laboratory-confirmed bloodstream infection. However, not enough clinical information was available to classify any of these as intravascular catheter-related infections according to the Infectious Disease Society of America guidelines [18] . However, the majority of cases were clinically managed as if they were bloodstream infections, with either the prescription of antimicrobials, catheter removal, or both.
Pharmaceutical compounding remains an important resource for both clinicians and patients who require specialty medications. The Food and Drug Administration has recognized and continues to recognize the importance of compounding by exempting compounded products from certain regulatory standards applied to manufactured products [1, 12] . However, because they were mass produced without a specific prescription, the contaminated heparinized saline intravenous flush syringes that were the cause of this outbreak did not qualify as compounded pharmaceuticals and should have been subjected to the prerelease testing required of manufactured products. Our investigation highlights what appears to be a trend that causes concern: compounded products are being sold in place of manufactured products [4] . In response, the Food and Drug Administration has indicated that it will investigate compounding pharmacies that appear to be manufacturing under the guise of compounding, especially those using largescale equipment or shipping substantial quantities of products out of state.
Clinicians, epidemiologists, and infection-control practitioners should consider exposures to compounded products when investigating outbreaks, especially those involving patients who have been treated with injectable pharmaceuticals. Staff who order medications for health care facilities should check with suppliers to ensure that medications that are ordered for general stock and not as custom products are indeed produced by manufacturing firms and not by compounding pharmacies. Because of the potential for substantially delayed infection among patients with indwelling catheters, efforts should be made to notify all clinicians who order and all patients who are exposed to contaminated infusions to be vigilant for signs and symptoms indicative of infection, even months after exposure.
